In the sixth section of Concept of the Political, Schmitt describes rhetoric as it relates to the concept of the political and in the process details the inaccurate use of the term “international.”
At one point, Schmitt states, “The political entity presupposes the real existence of an enemy and therefore coexistence with another political entity.” Here, Schmitt is stating that an entity of a political nature is inherently in a situation where it coexists with an enemy. It should be noted that with respect to the noting of the political entity coexisting with an enemy, the coexistence spoken of here is not a situation where the opposing entities are in a mutual state of amiability. The coexistence is also not a situation where the opposing entities are in a state of mutual compromise. Rather, the coexistence spoken of merely refers to the fact that the opposing entities exist simultaneously. It should also be noted that the political entity, by definition of being political, exists in relation to an enemy. Considering the fact that the political entity in question exists in relation to an enemy, it is essentially coexisting with said enemy. With respect to the political entity existing in relation to an enemy by definition of it being political, it should be noted that a political entity exists and acts in accordance with the concept of the political. This would involve a political entity existing and acting in accordance with the friend-enemy antithesis, and this would be because the friend-enemy antithesis is the criterion by which something is of a political nature. With this in mind, it can be seen that a political entity must, by definition, exist in relation to and exist simultaneously with an enemy entity. With the aforementioned quote in mind, Schmitt draws a conclusion and states, “As long as a state exists, there will thus always be in the world more than just one state.” This can be seen by the fact that states are inherently political entities and are thereby subjected to existing and acting in accordance with the friend-enemy antithesis similar to all other political entities. With respect to the quote referring to political entities and coexistence, Schmitt draws another conclusion as well. He states, “A world state which embraces the entire globe and all of humanity cannot exist.” An entity embracing the entire globe and the entirety of mankind would not be in a position of being in an existential tension with another entity or a tension where physical violence is a very real possibility. This would be because an all-embracing entity would embrace all and reject or oppose none. By definition of being all-embracing, the all-embracing entity in question would be unable to exist and act in accordance with the friend-enemy antithesis and thereby fail to be of a political nature. This would mean that said all-embracing entity would be unable to be a state, and this is because a state is by definition of a political nature.
Schmitt later states, “Humanity as such cannot wage war because it has no enemy, at least not on this planet.” Here, Schmitt is stating that humanity as a whole cannot enact war. This inability is caused by the fact that humanity does not have an enemy, and an enemy is a prerequisite for the enacting of war. While Schmitt does state that there could be grounds for arguing that humanity as a whole could enact war in the case that humans found an enemy, such an enemy has not been found. With this in mind, it becomes more evident that mankind as a whole cannot enact war. What can be drawn from this is that mankind as a whole cannot be a political entity and that mankind as a whole cannot be in a state where it is in a political tension with another entity. With the aforementioned quotation in mind, one can understand an assertion made by Schmitt. Schmitt states, “The concept of humanity excludes the concept of the enemy, because the enemy does not cease to be a human being—and hence there is no specific differentiation in that concept.” When Schmitt states that the concept of humanity excludes the concept of the enemy, he is stating that the concept of humanity or mankind as a whole cannot exist in relation to or simultaneously with an enemy. This is because humanity or mankind refers to all humans as a whole. If all humans are bound by one collective, there is no enemy to be spoken of. If there are enemies within the collective, then said collective is inherently of a pluralistic nature where multiple collectives exist, and said multiple collectives would be dividing mankind into different groups in opposition to each other. In essence, the existence of said multiple collectives would inherently mean that there is no unified mankind. It should be noted that the reason why Schmitt states that the concept of humanity or mankind as a whole cannot exist in relation to or simultaneously with an enemy is because an entity or collective that exists as an enemy does not transition into another form of some sort. In essence, what exists as an enemy does not undergo a change of no longer being human because it exists as an enemy. For example, if a group of anarchists and Marxists were bound in a political tension, both groups would exist as enemies in that the anarchists would be the enemies of the Marxists and that the Marxists would be the enemies of the anarchists. However, neither the anarchists nor the Marxists would end up transitioning into beings of an unhuman nature, such as lizards or pigs. With the two previous quotations in mind, one can better understand an assertion made by Schmitt. Schmitt states, “When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent.” Here, Schmitt speaks of a hypothetical situation where a political entity supposedly enacts violence for the sake of humanity and claims to enact its agenda for the purpose of fulfilling what is good for humanity. However, humanity as a whole cannot even enact intentional violence against another party because mankind as a whole does not have a political enemy. Also, what exists as an enemy or exists in accordance with the friend-enemy antithesis does not become unhuman. With these two things in mind, skepticism can be cast upon the motives of those who claim to fight for the good of humanity. With such skepticism in mind, Schmitt argues that those who claim to enact conflict against an enemy for the sake of humanity are acting dishonestly. This dishonesty stems from the fact that enemy entities or groups are bound in a tension of the most intense nature derivative from their existence and acting in accordance with the friend-enemy antithesis. This dishonesty also stems from the fact that as stated earlier, violence cannot be enacted for the sake of humanity. Rather, those who claim to enact violence for the sake of humanity are justifying their cause by using empty rhetoric. This use of empty rhetoric involves speaking of advancing the interests of humanity despite not actually advancing the interests of humanity. Rather, the empty rhetoric is used to muster support for the cause of those advancing the empty rhetoric. The empty rhetoric could increase the support and morale of those who support a given agenda enacted by those who promulgate the empty rhetoric. These supporters who believe in the empty rhetoric would likely be those who fail to understand the nature of the empty rhetoric and absorb whatever empty slogan or talking point spoken of with respect to advancing humanity. The absorption in question would further galvanize said supporters. The empty rhetoric could also subject itself onto those on the sidelines of the tensions between the opposing sides in question. These formerly uninterested individuals would find themselves joining the side using the empty rhetoric thinking they are advancing the good of humanity without realizing that they have fallen for empty rhetoric. In this way, the side using the empty rhetoric would continue to gain traction and support at the cost of its opponents. In the most recently quoted quotation, it should be noted that Schmitt refers to a state using the empty rhetoric in question. However, it should be noted that any organized political entity could make use of the empty rhetoric in question and that such a power is not exclusive to states. It should be noted that Schmitt does not believe that claiming to enact violence for the sake of humanity is the only form of empty rhetoric available to states. He states, “At the expense of its opponent, it tries to identify itself with humanity in the same way as one can misuse peace, justice, progress, and civilization in order to claim these as one's own and to deny the same to the enemy.” Here, it is stated that a hypothetical political entity of some sort, in this case a state, claims to enact an agenda for the purpose of advancing what is good for humanity. In this case, the political entity in question is misusing the concept of the good for humanity. In the same way, other supposedly virtuous concepts, such as peace, justice, progress, and civilization can be the subject of empty rhetoric of political entities. Said political entities would essentially be claiming these concepts as their own. In this way, said political entities would be depriving their enemies of the concepts in question. This claiming that inherently enables a deprivation enables the political entities doing the claiming to use empty rhetoric in an effort to galvanize their cause. It should also be noted that this claiming simultaneously forms an implicit antithesis between the enemy with whatever supposedly virtuous concept is being claimed. For example, a hypothetical group of anarchists in political opposition to a group of Marxists could be spoken of. The hypothetical group of anarchists could claim to act in accordance with justice, thereby giving off an appearance of being just while giving off the appearance that the group of Marxists lack the attribute of being just. Also, the group of Marxists would appear to be in opposition to justice on the basis of the group of Marxists being in direct opposition to the group of anarchists.
Continuing with his analysis of the usage of the term “humanity” as it relates to the concept of the political, Schmitt states, “[T]o invoke and monopolize such a term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity.” It should be noted that in this quote, the term that Schmitt is speaking of is the word “humanity.” Within the quoted text, Schmitt is stating that to claim the concept of humanity for one’s political group has a number of very real effects that could come into being. It should be noted that claiming the concept of humanity for one’s political group would involve asserting that one’s political group acts to advance what is good for humanity. With this in mind, it can be seen that the claiming of the concept of humanity would involve enemies of the claimants to be depicted in a certain manner. This depicted manner would enable the belief that the enemy group is in opposition to humanity on the basis of the enemy group being in direct opposition to the claimants. The claimants and the enemy group being enemies with respect to the concept of the political, there is a direct and existential tension between the claimants and the enemy group that is of the utmost intensity. With this in mind, it can be seen that the enemy group would be depicted as an entity that is in opposition to humanity. It can also be more clearly seen that the claimants, by definition of claiming the idea of advancing the interests of humanity, cast out the enemy group from the classification of being human. In essence, the enemy group is no longer viewed as human by those who believe the rhetoric of those who claim to advance humanity’s interests. With this in mind, it becomes clearer as to why Schmitt claims that the claimants of the rhetoric in question depict the notion that the enemy group is an outlaw of humanity. It should be noted that an outlaw is an individual who is not accorded the protections of the law. In essence, anyone is free to enact any sort of abuse upon an outlaw without having to consider punishment that would normally be enacted by the state. Such abuses would include those of an extreme nature, such as theft, and even murder. By no longer being viewed as human, the members of the enemy group are no longer afforded the protections of what it means to be human. Humans, even when locked in intense tensions, tend to be reluctant to enact violence upon each other for various reasons that relate to the opposition being composed of humans. However, if a group of individuals are no longer viewed as human, they are susceptible to being subjected to abuses of an extreme nature, and this seems to be what Schmitt speaks of when he states that war can be a vehicle that enables the coming into being of the most extreme inhumanity. Such an inhumanity could be a dehumanizing action on a group of individuals, such as a mass killing or a mass enslavement. It could also be a massive persecution project involving both atrocities.
Defining the concept of humanity, Schmitt states, “Humanity according to natural law and liberal-individualistic doctrines is a universal, i.e., all-embracing, social ideal, a system of relations between individuals.” Here, Schmitt aims to define the concept of humanity as it relates to liberalism. According to Schmitt, the concept of humanity, as it relates to liberalism, is a system of connections between people who exist at the individual level. While other perspectives may view families or other multitudes as the lowest denominator of society, liberalism views individuals as the most diminutive unit of society. With this in mind, it can be seen as to why Schmitt refers to the concept of individuals as opposed to some other unit of society. It should also be noted that Schmitt characterizes humanity as embracing all individuals and being of a social nature. Here, it can be seen that humanity is a sort of social web that connects all individuals. It should also be noted that Schmitt refers to humanity existing between individuals as opposed to encapsulating said individuals. Whether this is intentional or not is difficult to determine, but the general idea of humanity is still evident. Schmitt’s conception of humanity enables an understanding of a necessary condition required for the coming into being of humanity as a truly actualized entity. Schmitt states, “This materializes only when the real possibility of war is precluded and every friend and enemy grouping becomes impossible.” In this quote, when Schmitt refers to something materializing, he is speaking of the coming into being of humanity as an actualized entity. He states that this can only be the case if there is a not true possibility of war. When he speaks of war, he could be referring to really any conflict that involves enacting physical violence, especially for the purpose of physical killing. Whether it be the enacting of mere physical violence or a mass conflict on the scale of war, what can be seen is that mankind is inherently divided into multiple groups bound together in a highly intense tension. In the same vein, Schmitt speaks of another necessary condition for the coming into being of humanity. This necessary condition would be that it would be impossible for a friend and enemy grouping to be formed. A forming of a friend and enemy grouping would by necessity require the existence of opposing enemy groups. These enemy groups would of course be in direct opposition in a political tension, which is a tension of the highest intensity. Here, it can be seen that the very possibility of a friend and enemy grouping implies a divide within mankind, which would preempt the actualization of humanity. With this in mind, one can understand why Schmitt characterizes the relation between humanity and the political in a certain manner. Schmitt states, “Humanity is not a political concept, and no political entity or society and no status corresponds to it.” Here, Schmitt states that humanity is not of a political nature and that a thing of a political nature cannot have its form or being affected by humanity. In essence, humanity and political entities cannot affect each other or be associated in either way. They cannot even exist simultaneously because when one exists, the other ceases to exist. With this in mind, one can better understand Schmitt’s remark concerning a hypothetical universal society. Schmitt states, “In this universal society there would no longer be nations in the form of political entities, no class struggles, and no enemy groupings.” It cannot be definitively determined if the universal society referred to by Schmitt is humanity or if it comes into being along with humanity. This is because when Schmitt defines humanity, he does not speak of whether or not humanity includes the very humans it connects. However, the universal society, by being a society, inherently includes humans. Regardless of whether or not the universal society and humanity are one and the same, it can be seen that the state of actualization of the universal society and humanity occur at the same time in that they both come into being simultaneously, exist simultaneously, and leave the state of existence simultaneously. It should be noted that Schmitt states that in the universal society, which has an existence contingent upon the existence of humanity, there would be no existence of nations embodying political entities, no form of class struggle, and no enemy collectives. As stated earlier, political entities cannot exist simultaneously with humanity because the existence of political entities is contingent upon a political tension, which would imply an intense divide within mankind. This divide is antithetical to the very existence of humanity. In the same vein, enemy collectives cannot exist simultaneously with humanity because the existence of enemy collectives is contingent upon the existence of a political tension. With this in mind, it can also be seen that class struggles cannot exist simultaneously with humanity because class struggles presuppose intense tensions between classes where violence is a very real possibility. Considering what has been said about humanity, it can be seen that speaking of humanity is essentially equivalent to speaking of the entirety of the populace of the earth. In essence, for a political group or entity to claim to advance what is good for humanity is essentially equivalent to advancing what is good for all people. This claim inherently alienates the enemy group in that the members of the enemy group are either implicitly denied the status of being human, seen as opposing the populace of the earth, or both.
Later on, Schmitt states, “It is neither universal nor even an international organization.” Here, the term “it” refers to the League of Nations. In the quote, Schmitt is stating that the League of Nations is not an organization that is of an all-embracing nature or of a nature that is harmoniously unitary, especially in some sort of monolithic sense. One reason that Schmitt provides to support this claim concerns the relationship that the League of Nations has to the concept of the political. Schmitt states, “This body is an organization which presupposes the existence of states, regulates some of their mutual relations, and even guarantees their political existence.” Here, “this” refers to the League of Nations. With this in mind, it can be seen that the League of Nations is conducive to the existence of political entities as political entities in that its being is contingent on the existence of states, mediates and thereby acknowledges the enactment of policies by political entities that take the form of states, and ensures states that they remain political entities. In this sense, Schmitt believes that the League of Nations fails to be an all-embracing entity or an organization that is of a harmoniously unitary nature. In essence, the League of Nations fails to be of an international nature. This may leave one to ask what it means for an entity to be of an international nature. Schmitt states, “[I]t must be distinguished from interstate and applied instead to international movements which transcend the borders of states and ignore the territorial integrity, impenetrability, and impermeability of existing states.” Here in this quote, the term “it” refers to a sufficient condition that would guarantee that a given usage of the term “international” is of a nature that is correct and not intellectually dishonest. It should be noted that Schmitt makes note of focusing on the usage of terms with respect to their relation to honesty or a lack thereof. This is because Schmitt understands that many terms, especially those supposedly representing a virtue, tend to be used by political actors or entities in a manner that is incorrect and intellectually dishonest. Such terms may include humanity, justice, or progress. Going back to Schmitt’s quote surrounding the proper usage of the term “international,” one can see that the term “international” must refer to a form that is separate from and distinct from the what-it-is that is represented by the term “interstate.” In this sense, the term “international” must represent a what-it-is that embraces all nations as part of a harmonious whole that simultaneously disregards the very concept of territorial boundaries. In essence, if the League of Nations were truly an international organization, the League of Nations would not be concerned with acknowledging political machinations or ensuring the very existence of political entities or the friend-enemy antithesis as it relates to the concept of the political. However, the League of Nations is an interstate organization. In accordance with this, Schmitt states, “Immediately exposed here are the elementary antitheses of international and interstate, of a depoliticalized universal society and interstate guarantees of the status quo of existing frontiers.” Here, Schmitt states that the articulation that is representative of the form that is the concept of international denotes the very notion that the nature of what it means to be international is inherently antithetical to the nature of what it means to be interstate. This can be seen by the articulation that is representative of the form that is the concept of the interstate. Organizations of an interstate nature, such as the League of Nations, enable the existence of existing borders and thereby enable a continuation of circumstances where distinct nations of the earth are governed by distinct states. In this sense, the different states of the earth continue to be able to exist and act in accordance with the friend enemy antithesis, thereby continuing the very existence of the political. The continuance of the very existence of the political by a political entity would involve entering into a tension of the highest intensity, and considering this along with earlier comments on the nature of the interstate, one can see that the interstate is inherently antithetical to the international. With this in mind, it becomes clear that the League of Nations is inherently antithetical to the concept of the international. However, Schmitt does speak of what the League of Nations would be like if it were a truly international organization. Schmitt states, “ A [...] universal human organization would [...] have to accomplish the difficult task of [...] taking away the jus belli from all the still existing human groupings, and [...] simultaneously not assuming the jus belli itself.” Here, the universal human organization referred to by Schmitt is a hypothetical form of the League of Nations that would come into being if the League of Nations was an organization that was truly of an international nature. If the League of Nations were truly an international organization, it would have to prevent existing collectives from being able to enact war. This would mean that said collectives would be prevented from the possibility of enacting physical violence for the purpose of physical killing. It should be noted that taking away the ability for collectives to enact war is a necessary condition for an entity to exist as an international organization because if there are real possibilities of war between collectives within a supposed international organization, said organization would not hold the attribute of being international. This is because what is international embraces all within its composition and thereby inherently lacks internecine strife. In addition to preventing existing collectives from enacting war, an international organization such as Schmitt’s hypothetical conception of the League of Nations would also have to lack the ability to enact war. This is because an entity capable of enacting war would be able to enable the coming into being of a political tension. In the case of an international organization, the international organization would be in a tension where there would be a real possibility of the international organization enacting war against a subdivision or section of itself. If this is not the case, the supposedly international organization would be engaged in a war with said subdivision or section. Either way, the supposedly international organization would lose its international nature on account of it having lost its universal, harmonious nature.
Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of the Political. Univ. of Chicago Press, 2008.
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